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Holding Multinational Corporations
Responsible Under International Law
BYJOEL R. PAUL*
We usually view international law as a set of legal norms
generated by sovereign states According to the conventional story,
until the Nuremberg Tribunal, only states possessed rights and
obligations under international law, not individuals. In other words,
states were the exclusive subjects of international law
After
Nuremberg and the emergence of the U.N. international human
rights treaties, the conventional story teaches that international law
began to recognize individual rights.3 States, especially major powers
like the United States, often resist the development of international
legal obligations.
Recent developments suggest that while
governments may resist the expansion of international law and legal
institutions, private individuals and non-governmental organizations4
* Professor of Law and Director of the LL.M. Program, University of
California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, § 102 (1987). The primary sources of international law are
international treaties and conventions, customary practices of states accepted as law
and general principles of law common to most legal systems. Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
All three sources result from state practice.
2. In fact, the conventional story omits the reality that crimes like piracy were
long regarded as international delicts for which individuals could be punished, and
arguably, states were liable for injury to foreign nationals under international law. 1
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 278, at 565 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 6th
ed. 1947).
3. Even after Nuremberg, however, international law derived primarily from
state practice. See, e.g., GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-36
(1957); MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCrION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (1999).
4. NGOs have been particularly effective in developing support for
environmental efforts like the Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted Dec. 10, 1997, U.N.
Doc. FCCCICP/1997/L.7/Add.1 (1997), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol]. They have also contributed to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their
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acting both internationally and domestically are contributing to the
emergence of new international norms. These new international
norms confer greater rights and obligations on private individuals and
firms, shifting the focus of international law. One dramatic example
of this trend is the effort to hold multinational corporations
responsible for environmental damage and violations of human rights
and labor rights under international law.
Globalization, which has displaced colonialism and then the cold
war as the organizing principle of the international system, has
reduced the transactional costs of doing business in multiple
jurisdictions and, in turn, conferred enormous wealth on
multinational corporations. By pressuring states to remove trade
barriers, reduce the public sector, and liberalize economic controls,
globalization has moved some regulatory authority from popularly
elected national representatives to international institutions, which
are less democratically accountable.
Globalization's triumph symbolizes the economic, political,
military, and cultural supremacy of the United States. To a
remarkable degree, the United States has projected its mass culture,
language, law, market economy, and democracy onto a good chunk of
humanity, which has embraced it with enthusiasm for the most part.
In such happy circumstances, one might expect to find the United
States bolstering its foreign alliances and the international legal
institutions that have secured peace and a global market. Yet,
paradoxically, the United States increasingly resists global
governance. As a result, the United States now appears more
isolated from the international system it has fostered than at any
point since it assumed a global role in the first half of the twentieth
century.
Consider the U.S. opposition to international institutions and

Destruction, opened for signature Dec. 3, 1997, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1507
[hereinafter Landmine Convention] and the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 [hereinafter CEDAW]. See also Harold
Hongju Koh, Review Essay: Why do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2658 (1997) (stating that the "constructive role of international law ...will be
greatly enhanced if nongovernmental organizations ... participate in, influence, and
ultimately enforce transnational legal process[es] .... ); Julie Mertus, Considering
Nonstate Actors in the New Millenium: Toward Expanded Participation in Norm
Generation and Norm Application, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 537 (2000); Philippe
J. Sands, The Environment, Community and InternationalLaw, 30 HARV. INT'L LJ.
393 (1989).
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legal initiatives. Over the last two decades, the United States has

deployed military forces in Grenada, Libya, Nicaragua, Panama, and
Yugoslavia without authorization from the United Nations Security
Council, as required by the U.N. Charter The United States quit
UNESCO, failed to pay its U.N. dues in a timely manner, withdrew
from the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and
refused to comply with the International Court's orders on at least

three occasions.' Despite protests from foreign governments, and
injunctions issued by the International Court, the United States has
repeatedly executed foreign nationals without according them the
basic right to consult with their consular representatives as required
by the Vienna Convention 7 In addition, the United States has
rejected numerous efforts to codify and enforce human rights through
international institutions. For example, the United States has failed
to ratify the International Convenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights,8 the American Convention on Human Rights,9 the
5. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 42 & 51.
6. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (finding as a preliminary matter
that the I.C.J. has jurisdiction over the United States and over the subject matter of
the litigation); Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against

Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26). See also Case Concerning the
Vienna Convention On Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 IC.J. 248 (Apr. 9);
LaGrand
Case
(Ger.
v.
U.S.),
available
at
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igusjijudgment_20010625.htm
(June 27,
2001).
7. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T.
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. Since 1993, according to Amnesty International U.S.A., the
United States has executed twelve foreign nationals who were denied the right to
access to their consular representatives. Amnesty Int'l, Key Topics: Execution of
Foreign Nationals by the USA, at http://www.amnesty-usa.org/abolish/ (last visited
Sept. 17, 2001). In total, the United States has sentenced at least sixty-five foreign
nationals to death without complying with the Vienna Convention. Marcia Coyle,
Are 65 Illegally on Death Row in U.S.?, THE NAT'L L.J., Apr. 27, 1998, at A16. What
makes the U. S. violations of the Vienna Convention particularly offensive to many
allies is that the United States is one of the only industrialized democracies to employ
capital punishment. According to Amnesty International U.S.A., the United States
executed eighty-five people in 2000, and there were another 3,300 people on death
row as of January 1, 2001. Moreover, the United States has executed more child
offenders and mentally retarded prisoners than any other country. Amnesty Int'l,
supra, at http://www.amnesty-usa.org/abolish/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2001). I am not
arguing here that capital punishment violates international law; I am only asserting
that it offends foreign governments to the detriment of our foreign relationships.
8. International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (signed on Oct. 5, 1977, but never ratified by the United States).
9. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
(signed on June 1,1977, but never ratified by the United States).
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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women," the Convention on the Rights of the Child," and
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines.
Within a six month period, for example, the Bush administration
rejected the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, 3 the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 4 the Biological Weapons Protocol 5 to

enforce the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons, which banned such weapons," and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. 7 The Bush administration also
signaled its intention to repudiate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Treaty."
Further, the administration opposed an international
agreement to outlaw small arms trade and criticized an international
conference on racism. The United States appears increasingly
irrelevant to the development of international legal norms as efforts
like the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court proceed
without U.S. participation. Allies have expressed concern about the
growing incidence of U.S. unilateralism. 9
The shrinking influence of the U.S. government on international
legal institutions can be contrasted with the expanding efforts of U.S.
plaintiffs and attorneys using domestic courts to obtain redress
against international delicts. The defendants in these actions may be

10. CEDAW, supra note 4 (signed on July 17, 1980, but never ratified by the
United States).
11. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (signed
on Feb. 16, 1995, but never ratified by the United States).
12. Landmine Convention, supra note 4.
13. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4.
14. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, openedfor signatureSept. 24, 1996,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-28 (1997), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1439.
15. Biological Weapons Protocol, available at http://www.opbw.org (last visited
Sept. 17, 2001) (the protocol has not yet been opened for signature).
16. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163,
reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 309.
17. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), reprintedin 37 I.L.M. 999.
18. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435.
19. Thom Shanker, White House Says the U.S. Is Not a Loner, Just Choosy, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2001, at Al.
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states, private individuals, or increasingly multinational corporations.
There has been a marked upsurge in actions initiated by individuals
to hold multinational corporations accountable under international
law, particularly in the United States. Some of these actions concern
violations of human rights or exploitation of workers. Other actions
focus on environmental damage or damage to the cultural practices
and homelands of indigenous populations.
Actions to hold
multinational companies accountable under international law include
Alien Tort Claims filed in U.S. courts for complicity in genocide,
slavery and other crimes against humanity; claims brought against
banks, insurers and manufacturers that profited from the Holocaust;
and claims based on a range of codes and domestic regulations
designed to improve compliance with international law and increase
transparency.
The large number of suits filed and other domestic actions to
hold multinationals accountable represent both a frustration with the
limits of traditional international institutions and cooperative regimes
and a positive step toward building a new international legal order.
Individuals are taking international law into their own hands because
states have failed to act. By seeking redress in domestic tribunals,
individuals are also seeding domestic legal institutions with
international legal principles. Private citizens are becoming the
agents for internalizing international law in the domestic legal system
and refocusing international law on private actors, including
multinational corporations.
There is an ironic symmetry to the U.S. retreat from
international legal regimes and the affirmation of international law
demonstrated by U.S. courts. Privatization shrinks the public sector
while it expands the scope and freedom of private firms.
Internationally, the WTO, International Monetary Fund and World
Bank have promoted privatization and market liberalization in ways
that have benefited U.S. multinational corporations.
U.S.
multinational corporations often operate outside of U.S. regulation,
and U.S. courts have made it easier for multinationals to do so.' At
20. U.S. courts applying the principle of international comity have allowed U.S.
and foreign multinational corporations to opt out of our legal system. For example,
U.S. courts enforce foreign choice-of-law, forum or arbitration clauses in
transactional agreements that often frustrate the enforcement of U.S. antitrust and
securities laws. Joel R. Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1
(1991) (arguing that the principle of international comity, which is a uniquely U.S.
legal doctrine and not based upon international law, empowers private firms to avoid
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the same time, international law is becoming privatized in the sense
that increasingly individuals are both the agents and subjects of
international law. As the state was once the exclusive subject of
international law, the corporation, the state's creation, has now
become a primary subject displacing the state's exclusivity in this
sphere just as it has displaced state ownership and regulation in the
market. U.S. courts, as the principal forum for these cases, have
played an equally vital role in the privatization of international law.
The role of domestic courts in vindicating international law
illustrates one of the central propositions of Saskia Sassen's keynote
address to the conference, which is the source of this symposium
issue. Professor Sassen asserted that globalization is embedded in the
nation state; that is, globalization occurs at the national level and is in
fact subject to national controls." When domestic tribunals assert
jurisdiction over multinational companies, they are counter-balancing
the impact of globalization with a measure of international law.
Courts are asserting that multinationals should not and cannot escape
the precepts of the international legal system, which benefits
corporations worldwide. Globalization is occurring within the legal
system. While we think of globalization as a process of externalizing
the internal national economy, there is a concomitant process of
internalizing external or international legal norms and standards that
facilitates and complements the growth of the multinational.
This symmetry tends to subvert traditional international law
doctrine. Traditional international law is often delineated by a set of
dichotomies: public versus private international law and municipal
versus international lawY
These dichotomies determine, for
example, what party has standing to bring a claim against which party
and in what forum under what law. Over the last fifty years, these
boundaries have gradually eroded.
For example, private
international law conventions, like the U.N. Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (UNCISG), 3 transcend these
U.S. legal jurisdiction and imports public policy and international politics into private
law disputes).
21. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 1-26
(1998).
22. See generally Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private InternationalLaw, 7 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 149 (1988) (arguing that the separation of public and private international
law is historically contingent and that it has impoverished the practice and theory of
international law).
23. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 19
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categories. The application of international law to multinational
By
corporations further blurs these traditional boundaries.
empowering private individuals to seek redress against foreign firms
for violations of public international law, the law transects these
categories. The distinction in international law between what is
public and what is private is collapsing.
This geologic shift on the surface of international law is the
subject of this volume. This symposium issue of the Hastings
International and Comparative Law Review is derived from a
conference held on February 23-24, 2001, at the University of
California, Hastings College of the Law. The conference brought
together prominent legal scholars and practitioners from the United
States, Europe and Latin America to discuss these legal actions and
assess the future for holding multinational corporations responsible
under international law. The symposium included panels entitled
Multinationals and the Unfinished Legacy of Nuremberg; Litigating
the Alien Tort Claims Act; International Labor Rights and
Multinational Liability; Indigenous Peoples, Environmental Torts and
Cultural Genocide; Codes of Conduct and Transparency; and the
Ethical Obligations of Intellectual Property Owners. In addition,
Professor Saskia Sassen of the University of Chicago gave, a keynote
address on "The Globalization of Labor."
The papers in this volume represent a portion of the papers
presented at the conference. They address doctrinal and theoretical
gaps in the efforts to hold corporations accountable under
international law. Why has international law turned its gaze to
multinational corporations at this time and in this way? After all,
many of the claims against multinational companies arise out of the
Holocaust and the Second World War. After more than a half
century, why are litigants seeking redress from these corporate
giants?
One simple answer to the question is that the companies may be
the only tortfeasors still available to provide any compensation. The
individual bad actors are often dead, missing, beyond the
jurisdictional reach of domestic courts, or unable to satisfy large
damage claims. The immortality of the multinational corporate

I.L.M. 668. UNCISG is a public international treaty that prescribes how domestic

courts should determine the governing contract law in contractual disputes involving
foreign parties. It cannot be classified as strictly public or private, municipal or
international law.
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entity, its size, wealth and omnipresence in a variety of jurisdictions
make it uniquely attractive as a defendant.
The papers in this volume broadly address two issues. The first
set of papers addresses the concept of the multinational's corporate
identity. The creation of a separate legal entity to shield the liability
of its shareholders raises practical as well as theoretical problems in
holding multinationals accountable under national or international
law: When and how can parent companies be held liable for wrongs
committed by their subsidiaries? How can a domestic court assert
jurisdiction over the foreign affiliate of a domestic company? When
can a corporation be held liable for complicity in the crimes of a host
government? What remedies are appropriate against a multinational
corporation? When can courts impose criminal penalties against the
corporation, its directors, managers and shareholders, and how does
one punish a legal fiction? The second set of papers examines a
variety of approaches for holding multinationals accountable. These
papers address both the legal strategies for suing multinationals in
domestic courts and alternative strategies, such as voluntary codes or
disclosure requirements. More generally, these papers consider what
it means to incorporate international law into domestic legal systems.
In the first set of papers concerning corporate theory, Professor
Phillip Blumberg examines the historical development of the doctrine
of limited liability. Professor Blumberg shows that courts have lost
sight of the purposes of limited liability and have assumed without
serious consideration that parent companies should be protected by
it. Professor Blumberg examines the recent trend towards piercing
the corporate veil in federal courts, especially where limited liability
would defeat federal statutory law. He questions the Supreme
Court's recent decisions obstructing this trend and shielding parent
companies from liability. Professor Blumberg concludes that we need
to increase market and social pressure for greater corporate
accountability.
Contrary to the conventional understanding that multinationals
are able to escape domestic jurisdiction, Professor William Bratton
shows how corporate identity in part facilitates holding companies
liable and how the character of multinationals may make them
peculiarly susceptible to claims. Professor Bratton addresses the
equities- of holding a corporation liable for actions by the same
company during the Holocaust even though the shareholders,
directors, and officers have changed and often the structure, assets,
and business have changed as well. He suggests that since the
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company has benefited in multiple ways from its special status as a
legal entity, it should be expected to pay as if it were the same entity
that committed the wrong.
What is the appropriate penalty for a company that engages in
egregious violations of human rights? Professor Diane Amann
examines the equities and practical problems of imposing criminal
punishment on a legal entity. In particular, she questions the idea
that a company can be held responsible for acts of its agents.
Professor Amann suggests that in some extraordinary cases it may be
appropriate to "execute" the corporation by withdrawing its
corporate charter and liquidating its assets.
Finally, Professor Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi discuss the
principle of corporate complicity in human rights abuses. They ask
what responsibility a multinational corporation has for monitoring the
policies of a host government. Must the corporation merely refrain
from participating, or must it also take affirmative measures to
prevent crimes like forced labor? Reasoning from various judgments
by international and domestic tribunals, they conclude that while
international law clearly prohibits multinational corporations from
intentionally participating in an international crime, it is uncertain
whether corporations may also be held liable for silent complicity in
human rights abuses.
In the second set of papers exploring the means for holding
multinationals accountable, Professor William Dodge considers the
legal issues arising out of cases brought in U.S. courts under the Alien
Tort Claims Act. Professor Dodge argues for a broad reading of the
statute that is consistent with both the text and the original intent of
the first Congress. The principal issue of statutory interpretation is
what constitutes a tort in violation of the law of nations. In Dodge's
view, that language embraces all violations of international law, not
merely those which are universally recognized or regarded as
peremptory norms or ]us cogens.
Professor Michael Ramsey responds to Professor Dodge's
assertion that corporations should be held accountable under the
Alien Tort Claims Act. Professor Ramsey argues against Professor
Dodge's expansive view of the statute. Ramsey cautions that there is
a serious risk of judicial interference in the conduct of foreign
relations by the political branches. Ramsey challenges Dodge's
assertion that the Alien Tort Claims Act could have been intended to
apply contemporary international legal norms to multinational
corporations. Moreover, Professor Ramsey questions whether U.S.
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federal courts have personal or subject matter jurisdiction over
foreign multinationals in such cases and whether they can decide such
cases without running afoul of the foreign act of state doctrine.
Professor Ugo Mattei and Jeffrey Lena take a critical look at the
hegemonic implications of extending U.S. jurisdiction over alien tort
claims that arise entirely outside of U.S. territory. Mattei and Lena
describe the mechanics of jurisdictional rules and the practical
difficulties in bringing these claims and enforcing judgments overseas.
They point out that such claims are only economic and enforceable
against large companies that have assets and do business in the
United States. In their view, the global ambitions of U.S. law fail to
respect the jurisdictional limitations accepted by other legal systems.
Professor Beth Stephens discusses several strategies for holding
multinationals accountable. She argues that the multinational's home
country can more effectively regulate the conduct of multinationals
and that the host country cannot be expected to control the
multinational in the face of regulatory competition. Professor
Stephens traces the development of Alien Tort Claims Act litigation.
She points out that other countries have focused more on criminal
cases that incorporate claims for damages. She recommends that the
United States coordinate its efforts at holding multinational
companies responsible with the legal measures undertaken by other
domestic legal systems.
One alternative approach to civil or criminal suits is to require
multinational corporations to disclose the social, political, and
environmental effects of international corporate action. Using the
model of Section 14 of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act, Professor
Cynthia Williams recommends this regulatory strategy in her paper.
Professor Williams argues that the Securities Exchange Commission's
statutory authority is sufficient to require publicly held companies to
disclose how those companies are dealing with workers' rights,
environmental protection, and human rights issues at home and
abroad.
She also points to empirical evidence that disclosure
requirements benefit consumers and investors as well as the
corporations.
Another alternative strategy for influencing the conduct of
multinational corporations is the adoption of voluntary principles of
corporate conduct. Bennett Freeman, Maria Pica and Christopher
Camponovo discuss the recent adoption by the United States and the
United Kingdom of Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights. Freeman, Pica and Camponovo address the principles within
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the context of other corporate responsibility initiatives and show why
these initiatives may be more effective than domestic litigation. In
their view, multinationals are coming to recognize that what is at
stake is nothing less than "the social license to operate" in a favorable
global business environment.
Halina Ward discusses the concept of global corporate
citizenship. Ward argues that there is a "governance deficit" created
by the power disparities between developing countries and global
corporations. In her view, the equities of the situation demand that
the "flipside" of foreign direct investment should be "foreign direct
liability" and that the home country of the multinationals should
insist that they are subject to the same standards of conduct abroad as
they are at home. Ward suggests that the threat of liability could
pressure multinational corporations to conform their behavior to
international standards. She proposes an international convention to
regulate foreign direct investment that would empower developing
countries to hold multinational corporations accountable as global
citizens.
Professor Patrick Macklem considers the overlap between
human rights and environmental issues in the context of efforts by
indigenous nations to hold multinational corporations responsible.
He focuses first on the efforts by the Awas Tingni of Nicaragua
before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to stop the
harvesting of timber in their ancestral rain forest. In this case, the
Awas Tingni are asserting universal rights under international law.
Professor Macklem contrasts this approach to the efforts by the
Kitkatla First Nation of British Columbia to challenge the harvesting
of timber on their ancestral lands under the Canadian Constitution.
Professor Macklem argues that the Kitkatla's strategy is to assert
special rights. Macklem then goes on to compare the legal strategies
for asserting universal (undifferentiated) and special (differentiated)
rights. While the former appeals to the universality of human rights,
the latter derives from a frank acknowledgement of the historical
culpability of Europeans for the condition of indigenous nations. He
concludes that by asserting their rights, indigenous nations are
reconfiguring international law by blurring municipal and
international law.
There is a conceptual and practical unity to claims brought for
the protection of the environment and claims on behalf of indigenous
population groups, and that unity is the theme discussed by Robert
Coulter. Mr. Coulter discusses his experience representing the Awas
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Tingni in Nicaragua, which prompted a report by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights critical of the Government of
Nicaragua and a case before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights that recently was decided in favor of the Awas Tingni.
Martin Wagner considers still another case study of indigenous
people affected by the over-exploitation of their natural resources.
Wagner focuses on the U'wa tribe in the Andes mountains of
Columbia. He shows that the national government has not been
responsive to protecting the legitimate interests of the indigenous
population. Wagner notes that while the multinational corporation
has profited from the international system, indigenous groups have
not been given an equivalent stake under international law. Wagner
concludes that international law must fill the void left by national law
by according greater respect to the rights and interests of indigenous
nations.
Finally, Richard Herz addresses the underlying issue of whether
environmental damage and cultural genocide are sufficiently
established by the international community to constitute "torts in
violation of international law" for purposes of the Alien Tort Claims
Act. He argues that the courts which have considered this issue have
misunderstood the concept of cultural genocide and failed to
acknowledge the considerable development of international
environmental law.
These papers represent a significant step forward for the practice
and theory of international law applied to multinational corporations.
They offer concrete ideas and strategies to practitioners and insight to
legal scholars.
The reality of globalization demands some
countervailing effort to ensure that human rights will be respected by
global corporations. This volume maps the efforts that are already
taking place and envisions future possibilities for strengthening the
emerging international law.

